







Climate change policy distortions in the wood and food market 
 
Judith Ajani 
The Australian National University  




Contributed paper to the Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society 
National Conference 2010 
Adelaide Convention Centre, February 8 - 12.  
 
   2
Abstract 
 
The widespread shift of Australia’s wood products industry away from native forests 
to an agricultural regime–wood plantations–has enhanced forestry industry 
competitiveness. Wood now competes against food for agricultural land, water and 
other resources (including government support). New plantings have increased 
substantially since the mid 1990s via plantation managed investment schemes (MIS), 
arousing protest in the traditional agricultural sector and claims of unfair government 
policy treatment. This claim is investigated in an analysis that integrates the taxation 
treatment of plantation MIS with economics and forestry industry knowledge. Three 
methods are developed, and applied, to estimate the plantation MIS tax-based subsidy. 
Preliminary estimates indicate a tax-based subsidy to forestry through plantation MIS 
of between $0.9-1.2 billion over the five years ending 2008. The estimated subsidy is 
then incorporated in the Productivity Commission’s calculations of the effective rate 
of assistance (ERA) to industry groups from tariff, budget outlay and tax-based 
government policy. The ERA to Forestry & logging in 2008 was estimated to be 41.8 
per cent: government assistance is equivalent to 42 per cent of Forestry & logging’s 
unassisted value added. The estimated plantation MIS tax based subsidy accounted for 
77 per cent of the assistance. Assistance to Forestry & logging exceeds substantially 
the assistance (including drought related payments) to food growers: 7.2 per cent to 
Grain, sheep & beef and 17.3 per cent to Dairy cattle farming (a significant proportion 
was assistance that ceased in April 2008). A detailed examination of Australia’s 
proposed climate change policy concerning the land use sector indicates that 
agricultural resource use distortions created through plantation MIS arrangements are 





The debate over agricultural managed investment schemes (MIS) and plantation MIS 
in particular has attracted high media coverage, four parliamentary inquiries and a 
Treasury review. While the Government worked to close non-plantation agricultural 
MIS, plantation MIS remain immune. The debate about whether plantation MIS 
distort resource use, particularly in agricultural land and water markets, is bogged in 
tax law and its implementation. Advancing the debate requires integrating tax aspects 
with economics and forestry industry knowledge to clarify the nature of the subsidy 
and develop methodologies to estimate the size of the subsidy. 
 
In a paper presented on Australian Taxation Office (ATO) web pages, the former 
plantation MIS lobby group, Treefarm Investment Managers Australia (TIMA), 
argued that plantation MIS do not receive special tax incentives. They operate under 
the same basic tax regime as other agricultural enterprises (Cummine 2004). The 
paper concludes that, because plantation MIS investors do not receive special tax 
incentives, there are no tax-based subsidies.  
 
This conclusion is understandable if we leave to one side the detail of tax law 
implementation and economic efficiency as distinct from tax interests. Amendments 
to the Income Tax Assessment Act (ITAA) to address potential tax evasion through 
plantation MIS investment have generated today’s situation where the outstanding 
issue, from a tax perspective, is the potential for plantation MIS investors to minimise   3
their tax (not an illegal act) by deferring tax liabilities until income is received (for 
forestry, a decade or more into the future) which may be when the investor’s income 
falls into a lower tax bracket. If this aspect of tax minimisation is significant in the 
decision to invest in plantation MIS, the matter should be placed in a wider taxation 
context. Progressive tax systems have the potential to impose a higher average rate of 
tax for a taxpayer whose income fluctuates significantly between years as compared 
to a taxpayer with the same average income received at a constant rate per annum, 
such as some agricultural producers and artists (Lacey and Watson 2004). 
Agricultural producers and artists have special tax treatments to address this situation 
(e.g. tax averaging and income equalisation deposits). Lacey and Watson (2004) argue 
that the Government take a wider view of the role for ‘taxation products’ to enable 
taxpayers to smooth taxable income, thereby increasing competition with MIS in the 
market for tax deferral. Plantation MIS could be viewed as a complicated, high cost 
and inefficient de facto ‘taxation product’ to address period inequity. 
 
We now bring economic efficiency interests into the debate. The plantation MIS 
‘taxation product’ flows into the economy as a potential distortion in agricultural land 
and water use. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services Inquiry into Aspects of Agribusiness Managed Investment Schemes explained 
how: 
 
 ‘…, there is currently potential for MIS to use unprofitable high cost structures 
to provide greater tax deductibility to investors, while directing a proportion of 
this tax-related investment to related entities charging above commercial rates 
for project services. While investor focus is on minimising tax, rather than 
investing in the most profitable venture, this directs capital away from profitable 
uses and disadvantages traditional farming enterprises by increasing natural 
resource costs and encouraging oversupply.’  
(Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009 
pp. 45-6).  
 
The aim of this paper is to integrate tax issues with economics and forestry industry 
knowledge to establish whether plantation MIS embody a tax-based subsidy and to 
clarify the effect of plantation MIS tax arrangements on resource allocation (mainly 
agricultural land and water) between food and wood growing. Three methods of 
estimating the plantation MIS subsidy to wood growing are presented and tested 
empirically. The estimates are then integrated with the Productivity Commission’s 
effective rate of assistance (ERA) measures to gauge the potential for plantation MIS 
tax arrangements to distort agricultural land and water use, away from food to wood 
growing. The discussion applies this analysis to examine the potential for amplified 
inefficiency in agricultural resource use with the government’s proposed emissions 
trading system and related climate change policy measures for forestry. 
Recommendations conclude the paper.   
 




Investors (growers) in plantation MIS pay fees to a plantation MIS Responsible Entity 
to have trees planted and receive a share of the harvest revenue after specified costs   4
have been deducted. Investors do not purchase capital items, notably land, thus 
enabling their expenditure to be fully tax deductible. (The Responsible Entity acquires 
land–through freehold purchase or leasing through a third party–which is sub-leased 
to investors.) Investors can offset their expenditure against taxable income received 
from other activities. Borrowing money (the interest being a tax deductible cost) to 
purchase the MIS investment enables investors to claim a tax deduction greater than 
the amount they invest personally.  
 
Plantation MIS are focussed heavily to growing hardwoods for the woodchip market 
with Responsible Entities offering varying cost-structured products. Table 1 presents 
an indication of the spread.  
 
Table 1 Eucalypt chip log plantation MIS costs  
  WA Blue Gum Project 
2009 (Product Ruling 
2009/35) 
Great Southern 
Plantations 2007 Project 
(Product Ruling 2007/27) 
Gunns Plantation 
Woodlot Project 2009 - 
Option 1 (Product 
Ruling 2208/66) 
Establishment fee  
($/ha) 
5 500  10 000  7 480 
On-going costs 
($/ha/yr) 
600 for tending & land 
rent, indexed 
    
Other costs   15% fee when chip 
sales revenue exceeds 
$17 050 indexed. 
 Unforseen expenses 
for fertiliser or insect 
control. 
 Fire insurance. 
 Fee on credit card 
payments of fees. 
 Management fee of 
3.3% of net proceeds 
from chip sales 
(revenue less costs of 
logging, cartage 
shipping & sales 
costs).  
 Rent/lease fee of 
2.75% of net proceeds 
from chip sales.  
 Insurance premiums. 
  Management fee 
8.8% of net wood 
sale proceeds. 
  Rent - 5.5% of net 
wood sale proceeds. 
  Sales commission - 
2.2% of net wood 
sale proceeds. 
Rotation length  Clearfell at approx. 10 
years 
Clearfell at approx. 10 
years 
Clearfell at year 13 & 








not reported  $181  $207.40 
Source: ATO 2009b, c and d; GPL 2009; Great Southern Plantations 2007; WA Blue Gum Ltd. 2009. 
 
In 2009, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) reported 198 
registered plantation MIS, accounting for slightly over half of all agribusiness MIS 
(ASIC 2009 p. 47). The accountancy/financial services sector established most of the 
early plantation MIS companies, not companies engaged directly in wood growing. It 
is incorrect, however, to consider that the plantation MIS tax arrangement is 
assistance to just the specific plantation MIS companies and associated investors and 
not the wood growing industry. With the Government retaining the plantation MIS tax 
arrangements, despite the persistent public debate and numerous Parliamentary 
inquiries that it could have used to end the arrangements, wood growing companies 
(in a traditional industry sense) started establishing subsidiary plantation MIS 
companies and wood processing companies became potential wood buyers linked to 
specific MIS. The strength of forestry industry support for plantation MIS is clear in   5
the united and forcefully argued calls to retain the tax arrangements by all the national 
forestry lobby groups in their submissions to the Parliamentary inquiries. Plantation 
MIS accounted for 34 per cent of Australia’s plantation estate in 2008 (Gavran and 
Parsons 2009). 
 
Of the three projects presented in Table 1, the Great Southern Plantations 2007 
Project is the best suited for examining whether plantation MIS are unprofitable high 
cost structures providing greater tax deductibility to investors and distorting 
agricultural resource use. The Great Southern Plantations product required most of the 
investor’s money paid as a pre-determined establishment fee, meaning relatively less 
is paid at harvest time in fees on net woodchip sale proceeds, the amount of which is 
heavily dependent on two unknown variables–the actual wood yield and the woodchip 
price. Using Great Southern Plantations’ assumed wood yields, costs, prices and 
various conversion rates presented in their 2007 and 2008 Product Disclosure 
Statement and assuming all costs and prices remain unchanged in real terms over the 
10 year investment, reveals that investors would receive a 1.9% per annum nominal 
return on their investment: a loss in real terms (taking the average in Great Southern 
Plantation’s expected inflation rate) of -0.6% per annum. At least for products with 
high front-end loading of costs, the concern that plantation MIS may direct capital 
away from profitable uses is valid. Products with lower establishment fees but with 
the Responsible Entity sharing a greater proportion of the net sales proceeds are more 
difficult to evaluate because of the uncertainty about future wood yields and 
woodchip prices. Many analysts have claimed the projections are overly optimistic for 
both variables (for a history of the debate see Ajani 2007 pp. 254-258), but the proof 
is in the pudding.  
 
Plantation MIS Product Disclosure Statements typically do not include any direct 
statement or information about forecast project returns (ASIC 2009). Rather, relevant 
information is presented in an independent (forestry consultant) expert’s report 
included in the Product Disclosure Statement, but limited to forecast wood yields and 
prices. This arrangement, which meets ASIC’s requirement that Responsible Entities 
have reasonable grounds for any forecast statement (otherwise remain silent), means 
that investors have to calculate the return on investment or seek financial advice. 
 
The plantation MIS subsidy issue revolves around establishing whether investment in 
plantation MIS is inherently profitable. It is time to move into tax law and the ATO 
treatment of plantation MIS to examine how the ATO has deemed plantation MIS a 
commercial activity, thereby enabling investors to deduct costs against income earned 
elsewhere. These arrangements are crucial for plantation MIS viability.   
 
2.2 Taxation aspects–plantation MIS commerciality 
 
Following its loss in the courts over Budplan MIS, the ATO introduced Product 
Rulings in June 1998. Product Rulings allowed MIS Responsible Entities to provide 
relevant information for the ATO to rule on deductibility of scheme payments for 
investors. As long as the MIS was implemented according to the information on 
which the ATO made its decision, investors could be certain about the deductibility 
status of their claims. Obtaining a Product Ruling requires the Responsible Entity to 
supply the ATO with, amongst other things, an extensive amount of information 
supporting the profitability of the project–cash flow forecasts, budgeted profit and   6
loss statements and expert reports on these forecasts (ASIC 2009). Much of this 
information is not presented in the publicly available Product Ruling documentation. 
Plantation MIS Product Rulings (see for example ITC 2008) list clear factual 
information about the project, like establishment costs, fixed fees, location, species, 
plantation area etc., but not forecast returns, wood yields or prices. When it comes to 
scheme commercial viability, the ATO distances itself and advises investors to ‘form 
their own view’ and emphasises that Product Rulings do not guarantee commercial 
success: 
 
‘[T]he Commissioner does not (ATO emphasis) sanction or guarantee this 
product. Further, the Commissioner gives no assurance that the product is 
commercially viable, that charges are reasonable, appropriate or represent 
industry norms, or that projected returns will be achieved or are reasonably 
based.’  
 
In 2000, the Government responded to the Ralph Review of Business Taxation with, 
amongst other things, Division 35 amendments to the ITAA. The amendments aimed 
to remove the practice of presenting consumption expenses for non-commercial 
activities (for example, hobby farms) as business expenses. After first passing the 
business (as distinct from hobby) test, individuals or partnerships seeking to claim 
deductions for investments in new businesses against income earned elsewhere had to 
pass Division 35 rules for commerciality. The tests being that the business passes one 
of the following: 
 
1.  has an assessable income from the activity of at least $20 000, or 
2.  has produced a profit in three out of the past five years, or 
3.  uses real property or an interest in real property worth at least $500 000 on a 
continuing basis, or 
4.  uses other assets worth at least $100 000 on a continuing basis. 
 
Leaving aside very important arguments about the commerciality tests’ arbitrary and 
inequitable nature and scope for improvement (Lacey and Watson 2004), a review of 
matured (ex post) hardwood plantation MIS investments would probably find that 
most failed the first test and probably no plantation MIS investor would pass the other 
three tests (Test 2 is inappropriate for most hardwood plantation MIS with income 
received in the final year of a ten year investment).  
 
Plantation MIS investors have received dispensation from Division 35 with the ATO 
Commissioner exercising discretionary powers in specified areas. One being to give 
dispensation where the business has a lead time between the commencement of the 
activity and the production of assessable income and because of this is yet to pass one 
of the four tests but there is an expectation that it will do so. The example given by 
the ATO is an activity involving the planting of hardwood trees for harvest where 
many years would pass before the activity could reasonably be expected to produce 
income (ATO 2009a). To make the connection: the commercial loss provisions, 
which are specifically addressed in product rulings, require the ATO to consider the 
commercial viability of plantation MIS. In using his discretionary powers to give 
plantation MIS investors the right to deduct investment costs against income earned 
from other activity, the Commissioner must have judged that plantation MIS 
investments are inherently commercial by some criteria.    7
 
Lacey and Watson (2004) report that there is no publicly available data on the ATO’s 
operation of Division 35. Within the ATO’s system are tax returns from thousands of 
plantation MIS investors containing the key ex post information on deductions 
claimed and income declared for plantation MIS investments. A survey would clarify 
the return on their investment–the single most important piece of information in 
establishing the commercial viability of plantation MIS. It is also apt for the ATO to 
periodically (say five yearly) review the process and information used to rule on 
plantation MIS dispensation from Division 35 commerciality tests. 
 
2.3 Market evidence of plantation MIS profitability 
 
Doubts about the profitability of plantation MIS investments surfaced in the mid 
2000s, with early plantings coming on stream. Great Southern Plantations purchased 
all the wood from its 1994 project for $6.4 million, thereby meeting the investors’ 
expected returns, and sold the wood into the chip market for $2.1 million (Anon. 
2006).  
 
The collapse and subsequent sale of Timbercorp’s plantation assets to an international 
forestry investment fund provides further market valuation of plantation MIS 
investments. The sale included a $198 million payment to investors and the 
termination of MIS arrangements (KordaMentha 2009). With Timbercorp’s 90 000 
hectares of plantations (including large areas approaching maturity), this equates to an 
average $2 200/hectare, significantly less than the establishment costs of any 
plantation MIS product currently on offer. In late December 2009, Gunns received 
Great Southern Plantation MIS investor approval to become Responsible Entity for 
approximately 122 000 hectares of their predominantly hardwood plantations 
established through the now collapsed Great Southern Plantations (excluding Tiwi 
Islands plantations). At the time of writing, Gunns’ costs exclude any freehold land 
owned by Great Southern Plantations but include approximately $8.7 million for 
property, plant and equipment, water licences, insurance payment receivables and 
inventory and additional sums for managing the plantations over their first rotation. 
These costs are not expected to exceed approximately $20 million in any given year 
(Gunns 2009). Gunns also established flexibility over the age when plantations will be 
harvested (and therefore when investors will receive income) to allow for drought and 
market conditions. Investors in Great Southern Plantation 1998 to 2005 schemes will 
receive net harvest proceeds of an (area weighted) average of 63.4 per cent (Gunns 
2009). Investors in Great Southern Plantation schemes expected to receive 94.5 per 
cent of net harvest proceeds. In addition to the reduction in their share of net harvest 
sales revenue, investors are likely to have revised downwards their expectations of 
total harvest revenue to more realistic levels.     
 
The above mentioned 2009 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services inquiry into agribusiness MIS drew submissions relevant to the 
potential inflated cost problem. A corporate lawyer with 15 years experience in MIS 
advised of his 1995 plantation costing $1 200/hectare to establish on his farm through 
a forestry contractor. At the time, Great Southern was selling product at $9 
000/hectare (Smart 2009). Smart’s establishment costs align with those reported by 
Adrian de Bruin, former managing director Auspine Ltd. and a plantation forester   8
(Ajani 2007, p. 254). de Bruin also considered that as little as 25 per cent of the 
money raised through plantation MIS would be returned to the investor (Anon 2001).  
 
In contrast to this public evidence of substantial losses to plantation MIS investors, 
there appears to have been no public counter examples of profitability presented by 
Responsible Entities, TIMA or investors. Perhaps there is a valid explanation. 
Alternatively, perhaps investors have remained silent about any losses, fearing that 
declared losses may invalidate their earlier deductions (for expenditures on a business 
the Tax Commissioner judged to be commercial) against income earned from other 
activities. And a related point: investors may also be comforted knowing the tax office 
generally requires records to be kept for audit purposes for only five years–less than 
the time between plantation costs being declared and income received.  
 
2.4 Estimating subsidies for plantation MIS 
 
The Productivity Commission advises that their estimated effective rates of assistance 
to industry exclude subsidies through the plantation MIS arrangements, with the 
exception of an estimate for a now removed taxation provision, originally called the 
13-month rule (Productivity Commission 2009). Quantifying the assistance measures 
is complicated by the complexity of the financial and taxation arrangements of the 
schemes and severe data limitations. An ATO investigation of ex post plantation MIS 
investment performance, as discussed earlier, would fill a substantial information gap: 
as could ASIC in its work to make Australia’s financial markets fair and transparent 
so that investors and consumers make informed decisions. ASIC’s information 
transparency role is discussed in more detail below. 
 
The approach taken in this paper to estimate the subsidy to forestry through plantation 
MIS is to first simplify the task by limiting the investigation to the major product–
MIS investment in hardwood chip plantations. This will underestimate the subsidy by 
excluding the relatively small investments in softwood and hardwood saw and veneer 
log plantation MIS. Three approaches, as detailed below, were developed and the 
subsidy for each estimated using the following information and assumptions: 
 
  New MIS hardwood plantings over the five years 2004 to 2008 inclusive are 
estimated to cover 290 000 hectares (calculated using ABARE (2009) for 
total hardwood plantation area and Gavran and Parsons (2008) for 
ownership mix based on 2007 data). It is assumed that 90 per cent of the 
area is for chip production managed over rotations of around ten years–260 
000 hectares.  
 
  $3.7 billion invested in hardwood and softwood plantation MIS over the past 
five years (ASIC 2009 p. 49).  
 
  From the above, and deducting investment in longer rotation saw or veneer 
plantations with an arbitrary adjustment (because there is no publicly 
available data), the average hardwood plantation MIS investment over this 
five year period is assumed to be $10 000/hectare.   
   9
  The actual cost of planting a hectare of trees and managing them over the 
approximate 10 year rotation was estimated at $2 000/hectare (Ajani 2007 p. 
255). 
 
  All investors are in the top marginal tax rate.  
 
Approach 1: Tax deduction for true costs only  
 
If deductions on income were limited to the true cost of plantation establishment and 
management over the rotation
1, the difference between this amount deducted and that 
under the plantation MIS arrangements represents the investor’s assessment of the tax 
benefits of the higher cost MIS arrangements. 
 
This approach generates an estimated tax-based subsidy of $0.9 billion over the five 
years to 2008, $187 million per annum.  
 
Approach 2: Investor informed of return reality  
 
The tax benefit to the MIS investor is the tax deferral, but only if the MIS investment 
generates a positive return at the investor’s opportunity cost of capital. If not, the MIS 
investor would have been better off paying the tax rather than investing in the scheme.  
 
At this point, the complexity surrounding the investment return is revealed: as is the 
importance of the ATO/ASIC making available ex post return on investment data. 
Conceptually, plantation MIS have three returns to investors:  
 
•  the prospectus forecast return (which the investor must determine from the 
information in the Product Disclosure Statement which is heavily dependent 
on wood yield and chip price assumptions),  
 
•  the actual return (which may or may not have a Responsible Entity cross 
subsidised component as practiced, for example, by Great Southern 
Plantations for its 1994 plantings), and  
 
•  the ‘true’ return (not known, but may be possible to estimate through linking 
an ATO survey of tax returns with Responsible Entity financial accounts).  
 
While the actual and ‘true’ return should align eventually, the potential for tax-based 
subsidy in the intermediate term may be substantial following the Timbercorp and 
Great Southern Plantations collapses. Just as Great Southern Plantations had a 
commercial incentive to subsidise the returns to its 1994 investors (therefore 
maintaining confidence in plantation MIS to attract new high fee-paying investors), 
the same motivation applies to other Responsible Entities. If another Responsible 
Entity acquires a collapsed scheme at significantly below cost, this will enhance the 
Responsible Entity’s capacity to engage in this internal to the company cross-subsidy 
strategy.    
 
                                                 
1 This should be read as hypothetical. How much a taxpayer ought to spend in obtaining income is the 
taxpayer’s commercial decision and not for the ATO to say (ATO 2009).   10
Information asymmetry through moral hazard and principle-agent relationships are a 
feature of plantation MIS. Investors face the moral hazard reality that Responsible 
Entities, who act on their behalf, have more information and are also more insulated 
from the risk of their decisions: Responsible Entities may behave differently if they 
were exposed to the risk equally.  
 
It is likely that no investment in hardwood chip plantation MIS would have occurred 
if investors expected a 1.9% per annum return (nominal), as calculated earlier in this 
paper for Great Southern Plantations. Investors, most with their opportunity cost of 
capital many times higher than 1.9%, would be better off paying the tax rather than 
investing in the plantation MIS.  
 
In this case, all the tax deduction on plantation MIS would be a direct subsidy to the 
forestry industry. Extending across all hardwood plantation MIS, the tax based 
subsidy to forestry over the five years to 2008 is estimated at $1.2 billion, $234 
million per annum. 
 
Approach 3: Opportunity cost 
 
The difference between the MIS investor’s expected return and the yield on risk-free 
10 year Treasury bonds gives a highly conservative estimate of the investor’s 
valuation of the tax benefits of plantation MIS.  
 
On the basis that investors did their own calculations on a plantation MIS and 
estimated a return of 1.9% per annum (using the earlier Great Southern Plantations 
example) and proceeded with the investment, we can take the difference between the 
1.9% and 5.35% (current 10 year Treasury bond yield) as the investor’s valuation of 
the tax benefit of plantation MIS. This is a highly conservative estimate because most 
investors have a higher opportunity cost of capital than risk-free Treasury bonds.  
   
The tax based subsidy to forestry through plantation MIS investments over the five 




The estimates of the subsidy to forestry through the plantation MIS using the three 
approaches range narrowly between $0.9 to $1.2 billion over the five year period 
ending 2008. Obtaining actual return to investor data is the single most important 
piece of information for enhancing the quality of the subsidy estimate. In addition, 
such information would improve substantially on that currently available to investors 
and go some way to addressing the asymmetric information problem.  
 
 




Governments of fossil fuel powered societies, confronted with the catch up effects of 
the resultant green house gas pollution, seek politically attractive approaches to the 
climate change problem. Offsetting fossil fuel emissions using land-based   11
sequestration, through tree planting in particular, appears to be gaining traction in 
countries with relatively large agricultural land assets, such as Australia. A potential 
risk lies in the diversion of resources away from food production to carbon uptake. 
Because human survival requires climate security, food security and water security, 
prudence is required in formulating climate change policy to avoid such unintended 
consequences as food shortages. The Productivity Commission’s effective rate of 
assistance (ERA) measure is apt for evaluating and monitoring government climate 
change policy effects on agricultural land and water use.  
 
The Productivity Commission (2009 p. 18) advises that the ERA measure for the 
industry sector ‘Forestry & logging’ is a significant underestimate because it excludes 
under-priced native forest wood and tax based assistance through plantation MIS. The 
plantation MIS subsidy estimates presented in the previous section of this paper fill 
one gap, leaving outstanding the assistance to Forestry & logging through state 
government native forest wood pricing policies. As argued in the next section, it is 
important to fill the gap concerning subsidised native forest wood even though most 
plantations are now established on cleared agricultural land.  
 
Although beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that unpriced access to 
water by plantations is another form of assistance with trees using water from a much 
deeper soil profile than annual crops, which impacts on groundwater flows into rivers 
and streams.  
 
3.2 Wood stumpage price subsidies  
 
Historically, a range of statutory marketing arrangements, regulations and price 
support schemes made up the bulk of the measured assistance to agriculture. Most 
have now ceased in food growing (Productivity Commission 2009 p. 14), but native 
forest wood remains subsidised through state government stumpage (log price less 
logging and haulage costs) policy. This assistance escapes measurement because state 
and territory government assistance to industry, other than designated agricultural 
marketing arrangements and rural support programs, is not covered in the Productivity 
Commission’s assistance estimates (Productivity Commission 2009 p. 4). Based on 
ABARE sawmill survey data (Burns et al. 2009 p. 9), approximately 80 per cent of 
native forest wood sold in Australia was sourced from public land in 2006/07. 
Although plantation products continue to displace native forest wood products in all 
major markets (Ajani 2009), it is incorrect to conclude that the distortion created by 
subsidised native forest wood will eventually resolve itself. Rather, new native forest 
wood opportunities, most notably bioenergy, are being sought. If realised, the 
resource use distortion from subsidised native forest wood will broaden into the 
energy sector. This issue is discussed later in the paper.    
 
Native forest wood underpricing may have also influenced the heavy concentration of 
plantation managed investment schemes to the hardwood chip market. Due largely to 
low wood stumpages, native forest chip exporters appear to have enjoyed many 
decades of extraordinary profits (Ajani 2007). These profits are rarely reported: the 
information integrated with other business activities, like sawmilling and pulp 
production. The Eden based South East Fibre Exports (SEFE) is the exception with its 
business, until recently, virtually entirely concentrated on native forest chip exporting. 
SEFE’s after tax profit on equity averaged 34 per cent over the three decades to 2005   12
(Ajani 2007 p. 245). An easing in this long period of very high profits emerged from 
the late 1990s with SEFE’s after tax profits on equity tracking slightly above 20 per 
cent (Financial statements lodged with the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission). Implicit in the 1990s structuring of the plantation managed investment 
schemes is the assumption that the historical profit sharing arrangement built up 
between the (Japanese) chip buyers and the Australian native forest chip exporters 
(Ajani 2007 pp. 110-113) would remain. In other words, all hardwood plantation chip 
buyers would behave like the post WWII resource security-conscious Japanese paper 
industry and not use their buying power to forcefully drive real chip prices down. On 
paper, the architects of plantation MIS switched the high profits saturating Australian 
native forest chip exporters to the plantation MIS investors. The reality of this implicit 
assumption about market power is questionable, especially if Responsible Entities 
expect China to become a major buyer of Australian hardwood chips.  
 
Evidence of state government subsidised native forest wood and its extent has been 
researched periodically (see for example Byron and Douglas 1981, Dragun 1995). 
The research, however, is constrained by substantial information gaps in forestry 
agency financial reporting and the complexities in valuing ‘multiple-use’ public 
native forests for the purpose of determining returns on net assets (Forests Advisory 
Committee to the Minister for Economic Development 1983). In the near three 
decades since the Victorian Forest Advisory Committee’s report, there has been no 
advance in overcoming these information gaps in Australia’s main native forest wood 
supply states, with the exception of Victoria. Table 2 lists the basic information 
required to investigate native forest stumpage price subsidies and checks this off 
against the information provided in the latest financial accounts of the forestry 
agencies of Tasmania, Victoria and New South Wales–together accounting for 89 per 
cent of Australia’s native forest wood production in 2007/08 (ABARE 2009). Only 
Victoria gets to first base–presenting separate native forest financial accounts–the 
unintended consequence of privatising its plantation business in 1998. Forestry 
Tasmania, Australia largest native forest wood supply business, does not report its 
profit (loss) for native forest business activities separate from its plantation activities; 
the same for Forests NSW. For these two states, not even native forest stumpage 
revenue is reported.  
 
Theoretically, plantation parity pricing offers a way through these financial reporting 
gaps. Applying plantation parity pricing, however, runs into problems. In excess of 80 
per cent of the log cut in Australia’s major native forest logging regions is geared to 
woodchip production (Ajani 2007) and most of the substitutable hardwood plantation 
chip production is linked to MIS. Therefore, using plantation MIS log stumpage price 
assumptions is likely to generate a significant over-estimate of the native forest 
stumpage price subsidy. An alternative approach is to answer the question: what 
native forest stumpage price would Vicforests (the only state reporting on the profit 
performance of its native forest wood production business, see Table 2) need to cover 
its costs? The answer sets a lower limit to the estimated subsidy because there is no 
allowance for any dividend to the state of Victoria for its native forest business 
activities.     13
Table 2 Transparency in stumpage prices and financial reporting for public native 








Average native forest stumpage price   $16.50/m
3 not  reported
5 not  reported
7 
Net profit (loss) on native forest operations 
($ million)
1 
($5.0 million)  not reported
6 not  reported
8 
Native forest log production. (million m
3 2)  1.9 million m
3  2.4 million m
3  1.1 million m
3 
% pulplogs
3   66%
4 77%  41% 
Area of public native forest available for 
wood production (million hectares) 
3.2 million ha  1.0 million ha  2.0 million ha 
Source: VicForests 2009; Forests NSW 2009; Forestry Tasmania 2009; Audit Office NSW 2009; 
ABARE 2009. 
1. Profit (loss) after market adjustments, asset revaluations and tax. 
2. Quantities reported in tonnes converted to m
3 using 1.1t = 1m
3. 
3. Unquantified proportion of sawlogs are used in pulplog based products. 
4. 2007/08 estimate calculated by deduction using ABARE reported sawn timber production and sawn 
timber recovery factors. 
5. Annual stumpage price data is collected and used in forest asset valuations but reporting is limited to 
annual changes in stumpage. 
6. Forestry Tasmania reported a $32 million profit, which includes profit (loss) on plantation activities. 
2008/09 profit is a marked turn around from previous year loss of $38 million despite an 11% 
volume decline in log sales from 2007/08 to 2008/09.  
7. Stumpage revenue is reported for all log sales–68% was from the plantation estate. 
8. Audit Office NSW (2009) reported a loss of $14.4 million.  
 
 
Eliminating Vicforest’s $5 million loss in 2008/09 requires a 16 per cent increase 
($2.60/m
3) in its native forest stumpage price. Extending this $2.60/m
3 increment to 
Tasmania and NSW generates an increased annual stumpage revenue across the three 
states of $14 million. This is considered a conservative estimate of the subsidy on 
wood from public native forests.  
 
3.3 Effective rates of tariff and budget assistance to food and wood growers 
 
The shifting of wood production to plantations has brought new competition to certain 
food growers for agricultural land and water. This competition aligns approximately 
to the Productivity Commission’s industry classifications ‘Dairy cattle farming’ and 
‘Grain, sheep & beef’, which includes wool and omits fisheries, horticulture and fruit 
growing and other crop and livestock farming. From here on, these activities are 
referred to as food growing. 
 
The Productivity Commission’s estimated assistance to food growing, including 
drought related payments, is presented in Table 3. Also presented is the estimated 
assistance to Forestry & logging totalling $272.5 million in 2007/08. This comprises 
the Productivity Commission calculated net tariff assistance of $12.9 million 
(Productivity Commission 2009 p. 17), estimated state government native forest wood 
pricing assistance (calculated in Section 3.2),  Productivity Commission estimated 
Commonwealth Government outlay assistance of $35.6 million (Productivity 
Commission 2009 p. 17) and the estimated assistance through plantation MIS taxation 
arrangements of $210 million (calculated using the average of the first two 
approaches in Section 2.4).  
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Table 3 Effective rate of tariff and budgetary assistance for wood and food growing 
2007/08 (%)
 

























12.9 49.6 210.0  272.5  652.6  41.8 
Grain, sheep 
& beef 
-15.9 937.7  107.2  1  028.9  14  290.3  7.2 
Dairy cattle 
farming 
-3.6 300.3  21.8  438.7
a 2  535.8  17.3
a  
a. Combined assistance includes $120.1 million for agricultural pricing and regulatory assistance that 
ceased in April 2008. Source: Productivity Commission 2009 with gaps in Forestry & Logging filled 
using the analysis presented in Sections 2.4 and 3.2 of this paper. 
 
 
The estimated effective rate of combined assistance to Forestry & logging is 41.8 per 
cent: government assistance is equivalent to 42 per cent of Forestry & logging’s 
unassisted value added. This exceeds substantially the assistance (including drought 
related payments) to food growers (Table 3). At such significant differentials, 
government assistance works to redirect agricultural land, water and other resources 
away from food growing to wood growing relative to an unfettered market outcome.   
 
 
4.  Policy discussion 
 
4.1 Who bears the risk?  
 
Australia’s Constitution, which saw the states retain responsibility for Crown land, 
has influenced greatly the nature of government assistance to the wood and wood 
products industry. State public servant foresters managed public native forests to 
supply wood to private industry. This arrangement continues today with subsidised 
wood contributing to the losses of government native forest wood production 
businesses (Table 2 including note 8) to the advantage of native forest wood 
processors. Because competing forest land uses (largely native forest conservation) 
operate outside the market, land use contests play out in the democratic competition 
for votes. Effective rates of assistance measures cannot easily bridge the two markets: 
the market for votes and the market for profits. Long-entrenched subsidised native 
forest wood has slipped under the radar in industry policy.  
 
Australian forestry changed fundamentally with the introduction of agriculture for 
wood production–plantations. It brought new players and technology into the 
industry’s manufacturing arm and raised productivity and competition. The associated 
substantial Commonwealth Government assistance for tree planting over the 1970s 
and 1980s–mainly softwoods for sawlog production (Ajani 2007)–did not however 
generate new competition for agricultural land because most of the land for planting 
was obtained through clearing native forests. In this situation also, effective rates of 
assistance measures are marginalised.  
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Clearing native forests for plantations, however, triggered waves of protest 
(Plumwood and Silvan 1973) and now all states have policies restricting, to varying 
degrees, clearing native vegetation for plantations. Australia’s adoption of the Kyoto 
protocol carbon accounting system is likely to further reduce planting on native 
forested land because, under Kyoto accounting, the land is considered to remain 
‘forested’: therefore, tree planting can not be recorded as CO2 removal to earn credits. 
Plantation wood growing in Australia is now focussed largely to agricultural land and 
the importance of generating realistic ERA measures for forestry shifts from being of 
marginal value to highly valuable in quantifying the distributional effect of 
government polices on agricultural land, water and other resource use.     
 
Over Australia’s 130-year plantation wood growing history, many arguments have 
buttressed the case for government assistance for plantation establishment: self-
sufficiency and by implication the trade deficit, addressing land degradation, as 
countervailing assistance to low native forest log stumpages, regional development, to 
address market failures associated with long rotation times, rural jobs and more 
recently CO2 removals. Leaving to one side CO2 removal that is discussed below, the 
argument that retains traction concerns the linkage of long plantation rotations to 
capital market failure (see for example Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services 2009 p. 46). There appears, however, to be no 
evidence of capital market failure resulting in plantation investors not being able to 
access finance. Higher interest rates may accompany finance for planting, but this is 
normal for any long-term and therefore more risky investment. 
 
Government engagement in native forest wood production originally linked the public 
sector to the risk associated with long lead-time forestry. Wood buyers–the 
manufacturing arm of the industry–have become accustomed to this arrangement for 
well over a century. When state governments started investing in plantations, the risk-
sharing arrangements generated oversupplied wood markets, again highly attractive to 
cost-conscious commodity wood buyers (Ajani 2007). When state governments began 
scaling down their plantation investments from the early 1990s, new plantation 
investment flattened for a decade before the revival by plantation MIS. Under 
plantation MIS, the market risk remained deflected from wood buyers with tax 
minimising investors joining the public purse to bear most of the risk. Decades of 
successful risk avoidance explains forestry’s high effective rate of assistance measure 
as presented in Table 3. The challenge for governments seeking to bring forestry’s 
effective rate of assistance into line with that of competing agricultural land and water 
users is to encourage the wood and wood products industry to grow up economically. 
This means, in particular, an industry whose managers and boards are able to manage 
risk and governments who prevent industry deflecting risk onto the public purse.  
 
If the ERA differential between forestry and food growing remains significant, 
agricultural land and water will be allocated inefficiently to wood and away from 
food. Some in the forestry industry may see this as correcting for past land clearing 
for agriculture: ignoring that plantations are agriculture not native forests. Whilst the 
tension between forestry and traditional agriculture has dissipated since the days when 
forest agencies were branches within land departments that facilitated extensive land 
clearing, it would be wrong to conclude that growers of food and wood are partners in 
the Australian agricultural enterprise with resources, especially land, allocated 
through unfettered market price signals. Today, government forestry policy (notably   16
at the national level) is integrated within the agriculture portfolio but the forestry 
industry lobbyists continue their historical practice of remaining outside the 
agriculture club. This brief historical policy background, combined with the ERA 
analysis, establishes the context for examining the role the Australian Government is 
now creating for plantations in climate change policy. 
 
4.2 Plantations and the proposed emissions trading system, renewable energy 
targets and tax arrangements for carbon forest sinks 
 
Tree planting (‘reforestation’ or ‘afforestation’ using Kyoto protocol terminology) is 
the only land use CO2 removal activity able to participate in Australia’s proposed 
emissions trading system (ETS).
2 Opting-in ‘reforestation’ participants would be 
required to establish a Kyoto ‘forest’ for 100 years, this being a 0.2 hectare or greater 
area of trees that have the potential to reach two metres in height with a 20 per cent or 
more canopy (Australian Government 2008). Opting-in participants face two 
‘reforestation’ options: 
  
  not for harvest projects–trees grown for carbon storage and not harvested over 
the 100 years, or  
 
  wood and biofuel production projects–with logged areas replanted to maintain 
the land as Kyoto compliant ‘forest’ for 100 years. 
 
It is unlikely that productive food producing land will be used in the ‘not for harvest 
option’ given its opportunity cost of a century of income from food growing. (The 
efficiency of planting and maintaining an area of trees for 100 years relative to other 
carbon storage options like not clearing native vegetation, restoring degraded native 
forests or establishing criteria to ensure the planted ‘forests’ are multi-species and 
have self-regenerating capacity is a very important issue but out of the scope of this 
paper.) 
 
The second option–establishing new areas of Kyoto ‘forests’ for wood, biofuels and 
other products–will bring increased competition for agricultural land and water and 
highlights the importance of comprehensive ERA measures for wood and food 
growing. Under this option, the Government proposes to issue permits (CO2 credits) 
for tree planting on an average crediting basis (Australian Government 2008). Permits 
would be issued for net greenhouse gas removals up to a limit. For a 25 year rotation 
plantation, for example, opting in growers would receive permits over the first half 
(approximately) of the first of the four rotations. By limiting permits to the average of 
the carbon stored in the ‘forest’, growers will not be required to buy permits for the 
                                                 
2 Using land based CO2 removals to offset fossil fuel emissions is double-dipping, made possible in the 
setting of the base year for carbon accounting. Most of the carbon emissions from earlier land clearing, 
in Australia and globally, remain as a stock in the atmosphere. Replanting trees will draw down that 
stock, but Australia’s proposed ETS has tagged the drawdown as an offset against fossil fuel emissions 
(Brendan Mackey pers.comm.). Globally and from a science perspective, the base should be set pre the 
industrial revolution because emissions since the industrial revolution remain in the atmosphere as a 
stock. Combining this base with rigorous carbon accounting (incorporating carbon stocks and all major 
flows from the land sector measured in gross terms (Blakers 2009) as is done for financial accounts), 
would establish scientific rigor to the treatment of land-based offsets. The funding of efficient and 
effective land based climate change mitigation activities can still be linked to carbon trading/tax 
revenue but not via offset credits against fossil fuel emissions.      17
emissions on logging or for any emissions through fire so long as the ‘forest’ is 
replanted after these events. This arrangement means that, once the ‘forest’ is 
established, the CO2 price signal to growers is blocked for the next 100 years. It 
effectively ensures that the ‘forest’ will be harvested for wood (or biofuels) despite 
movements in CO2 prices relative to wood. In addition, it is unclear to what extent the 
public will bear the risk if a plantation is destroyed or otherwise fails to store carbon 
for the required period and it appears the public bears the emissions cost if the 
plantations are not re-established after the 100-year expiry date. 
 
In unfettered markets however, plantation owners are likely to forgo wood production 
and preference carbon production at relatively low CO2 prices. This is because only 
half the plantation biomass is suitable for wood production but all the plantation 
biomass is suitable for selling into a carbon market (Wood and Ajani 2008). The 
average crediting approach ensures that a CO2 price signal works to stimulate 
plantation investment, but once the plantation is established, average crediting 
eliminates the CO2 price signal and therefore the risk to wood buyers of growers 
preferencing the carbon market and keeping plantations unlogged.  
 
In August 2009, Australia adopted a 20 per cent renewable energy target. Renewable 
sources would account for 20 per cent of grid-based electricity production by 2020. 
Wood from both native forests and plantations was classified as a renewable energy 
source. The Government considers that provided the land remains forested, logging 
for wood and/or biofuels is carbon neutral and therefore should be CO2 cost free. 
Leaving aside the issue of the ecological soundness or otherwise of using native 
forests for electricity, the carbon neutrality ruling ignores the temporal dimension of 
carbon flows in a plantation wood growing regime. The CO2 emissions from biofuels 
made from say 20-year-old plantations will be CO2 cost free for the 20 years of 
regrowing required to drawdown the emissions (In reality the removals are offsets to 
earlier land clearing, see footnote 2). These arrangements work against efficient 
resource use in the energy sector by disadvantaging renewable energy systems that 
have no temporal risk for climate change mitigation. So far, there are a limited 
number of plantation MIS that include biofuels in the product mix (see for example 
ATO Product Ruling 2007/45).   
 
Completing this description of the regulatory framework for plantations in Australia’s 
climate change policy requires mention of the still contested interpretation of 
subsection 40-1010(3) of the ITAA. Senator Milne, on the basis of legal advice that 
capital expenditure ‘in relation to’ the establishment of trees in carbon sink forests 
means that land purchase costs and other associated capital costs are fully deductible 
upfront from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2012, moved to disallow the guidelines relating 
this part of the ITAA (Senate Hansard 1 December 2008 p. 7716). The motion 
generated a long debate, which on reading appears not to clarify the taxation treatment 
of capital expenditure for carbon sink forests. Perhaps the legislation could have been 
drafted more clearly, but Milne’s legal advice warns that the near unimaginable may 
be a legal reality: that capital expenditure ‘in relation to’ the establishment of trees for 
carbon sink forests may be fully deductible. If correct, the amended legislation would 
be a fundamental change from the ordinary taxation treatment of capital expenditure.  
 
Research into the effect of the ETS on agricultural land use change has ignored the 
plantation MIS tax-based subsidy, although the MIS arrangement is likely to be the   18
implementation mechanism. Lawson et al. (2008) estimate that at a CO2 
commencement price of $20.88/t in 2010 increasing by an average 4 per cent per 
annum to 2050, around 5.8 million hectares of  agricultural land may shift into 
‘forested’ land: around 3 million hectares as commercial plantations and 2.7 as 
environmental plantings. At a commencement CO2 price of $29.10/t, Lawson et al. 
(2008) estimate a 26 million hectare ‘forestry’ land use change between 2007 and 
2050 comprising slightly over 4 million hectares of additional commercial plantations 
with the remainder being environmental plantings. The CSIRO, based on work they 
describe as “prospecting’ for opportunities”, reports that 17 million hectares of 
agricultural land may be suitable for carbon ‘forestry’ through a combination of 
biodiverse carbon sink plantings and commercial plantations (CSIRO 2009 p. 12 & 
112). Like Lawson et al. (2008), the research ignores the plantation MIS arrangement 
and complementary measures to classify wood as a carbon neutral renewable energy 
source. The omissions reinforce the importance of incorporating plantation MIS 
arrangements into the Productivity Commission’s ERA measures.    
 
 
5.  Recommendations 
 
The preliminary ERA estimates presented in this paper incorporating government 
assistance to Forestry & logging through the plantation MIS suggest substantial 
distortion in resource use in Australia’s agricultural industries, away from food to 
wood. The plantation MIS, combined with emerging climate change policy for the 
land use sector which privileges tree planting as the sole land-based offset in the 
proposed ETS and assumes away temporal issues in classifying wood as a carbon 
neutral renewable energy, is likely to exacerbate the distortion.      
 
To create the information for policy debate and policy making, evaluation and 
monitoring, it is recommended that: 
 
1.  Treasury and the ATO conduct five-yearly reviews (with the first to be 
undertaken immediately) of the process and information used to rule on 
plantation MIS dispensation from Division 35 commerciality tests. 
 
2.  The ATO, ASIC, Treasury and Productivity Commission establish a publicly 
accessible plantation MIS reporting and monitoring system where, at a 
minimum, the key variables–return on investment, wood yield and woodchip 
prices–are tracked over time for each project.  
 
3.  The Productivity Commission’s ERA estimates be expanded immediately to 
include assistance through plantation MIS using, in the first instance, 
Approach 1–tax deduction for true costs only. 
 
4.  Failing State Government engagement in Tasmania and New South Wales in 
particular, the Australian Government intervenes to ensure greater 
transparency in state native forest wood production businesses, including 
separate financial reporting of native forest wood production profits (losses), 
stumpage revenues and log sales for major product groups (saw/veneer log, 
chip log and bioenergy). 
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To assist in policy development aimed at food and climate security, it is 
recommended that: 
 
5.  The Australian Government initiate a major investigation into the land use 
sector’s potential contribution to climate change mitigation, setting as the first 
task the compilation of a coherent system of land use sector carbon accounts 
that includes carbon stock measures together with separately reported 
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